In my last issue of Free Life Commentary, I suggested that it would be useful to press the Israelis into a settlement of their borders more acceptable to Islamic opinion. This has provoked a flurry of e-mails, some of them accusing me of wanting to throw Israel to the wolves, some even accusing me of anti-semitism. This is a false but serious charge, so I think it appropriate to explain what I believe is the most reasonable Western policy towards Israel. Before I develop this point, however, I will more fully explain my thinking on foreign policy.

In general, I think the world would be a less violent place if it mainly consisted of nation states, each acting to preserve its own borders and other narrowly defined interests. This would give a predictability to international relations of the sort that existed in Europe between 1648 and 1914—a period in which, with the arguable exception of those against the French Revolution, hugely destructive wars were avoided. The problem with moralistic crusades for democracy or human rights, or whatever, is that they involve unpredictable actions in support of often unachievable ends. The natural result is unlimited national or ideological hatreds that lead to permanent instability.

This being said, each nation within a particular civilisation has a secondary interest in not damaging the survival of that civilisation. To illustrate this point, I will say that Britain—or England, depending on what happens in Scotland—has an interest in withdrawing from the European Union. Once we are out, we have a further interest in breaking up what remains of the European Union, and this may involve an understanding with Russia to check any remaining ambitions the French and German ruling classes have in dominating Europe. But an understanding with Russia is only advisable on the assumption that Russia today is a normal state with its own limited national interests. Soviet Russia was a different kind of state; and any understanding with it that might have increased its influence in Europe would not have been appropriate. That would have damaged the civilisation of which we are a member state, and that would not have been in our own long term interests.

In the same way, the Fourth Crusade of 1204 was unwise. The Venetians may have had a legitimate quarrel with the Byzantine Empire, but to take Constantinople and divide up the Empire into indefensible units was a disaster for Christendom. In the short term, it was useful for Venice to control the eastern trade. In the longer term, it removed what had for centuries been the only obstacle to Islamic expansion into Eastern Europe and the Balkans. A more enlightened Venetian policy would have been to gain control of the Empire without weakening its strength against other enemies.

Furthermore, it is not enough to refrain from seriously undermining other states within a particular civilisation. It is also advisable from time to time to perform such good offices as may not be greatly incompatible with a state's own interests. Therefore, it was appropriate for the European great powers to give limited support to the Greeks during the 1820s in their revolt against Turkish rule. For Britain to have got itself into a long and expensive war in support of the Greeks would have been against our national interests. But to join in the limited intervention that ended the Greek War of Independence was justified by our secondary interest in strengthening the European civilisation of which we were a part.

Nowadays, our civilisation is no longer specifically Christian or European, or even white. It is the civilisation of the West. This is defined by adherence to a common set of values—rationality and the scientific method, and a regard for limited government and the maintenance of a private sphere within which individuals may securely direct their own lives. Japan, if somewhat eccentric, is part of this civilisation. So is Taiwan. Obviously, so is the State of Israel. Some Israelis—the followers of the late Meyer Kahane, for example - dispute this, saying quite unpleasant things about gentiles and gentile civilisation. But the Israelis on the whole are undeniably a Western people. As such, they have a limited claim on the friendship and support of other Western states. An attack on Israel that threatens its destruction is to some extent an attack on the West.

I think that setting up the State of Israel was a mistake. If the first generation of Zionists had been blessed with foresight, they would have set aside their emotional preference for Palestine and worked for a Jewish national home in some less dangerous part of the world. But that is a useless observation for today. The State of Israel does exist. Its citizens mostly have nowhere else to go. Its existence is precarious; and it does have the limited claim that I have mentioned.

So what should be the nature of Western support? Certainly, it includes diplomatic support and some sharing of military intelligence. It also includes not interfering with those Jews in other Western countries who want to give financial support, or even to enlist in the Israeli armed forces—though it might not be convenient for another state to intervene on behalf of any of its citizens who are taken prisoner while on active service with the Israeli forces. In the absence of any other interest, however, this support should not include military guarantees. The Israelis would be highly surprised if the British Government were to seek their help in keeping Scotland within the United Kingdom. For the same reason, it is not in itself appropriate for us to guarantee the survival of Israel.

For various reasons, the Americans have given Israel more than the limited support that I have described. So far as I can tell, this has not been in America's national interest as narrowly conceived. But it was until last month only a moderately expensive support. However, the hijack bombings have sharply increased this expense. It is now possible for those who oppose American policy to cause damage on a scale that no civilian state can afford to ignore. Therefore, American support For Israel will inevitably be curtailed. Whether there are moral arguments for or against is beside the point. Support will be curtailed.

Unless the expense of giving any support at all to Israel were to become absolutely prohibitive, the Americans have an interest in not refusing what have become the traditional expectations of another Western state. There is some value in respecting even implied treaty commitments, whether or not it was wise to enter into them. The Americans, therefore, should not radically curtail their support for Israel, let alone abandon the country. But they do now have a powerful interest in pressing Israel to reach a settlement with its Arab neighbours and subjects that has some chance of satisfying most people in the region. There are some Moslems who deny that Israel has any right to exist. But this does not seem to be the consensus of opinion. Even Osama bin Laden, I notice, has only demanded Israeli withdrawal from the Occupied Territories.

If I am wrong in this belief, then the Americans might find it useful simply to continue supporting Israel in a more detached manner. Otherwise, though, it would be convenient to insist on the creation of a reasonably sovereign and reasonably viable Palestinian state. The argument that there is already a Palestinian state called Jordan may or may not be correct. But it is irrelevant. What is relevant is that a stable peace in the region seems to require at least a partial surrender of the territories held outside the recognised borders of Israel.

I think this explains my position on Israel. Turning to the accusation made by one correspondent that I am an "Arab appeaser", I will say that I do not just believe in buying off further terrorist attacks by pressing for a Middle East settlement. Purely by itself, that would be perceived as weakness, and would be followed by further demands backed by force or the threat of force. It is the nature of the strong to dominate the weak; and it would not be in the interests of any Western country for the main Western power to let itself be seen as ready to concede whatever was demanded with sufficient firmness. Any concessions must be balanced by an absolutely ruthless punishment of those who planned or enabled the hijack bombings. As I said last Monday, military action needs to be limited to those who are credibly guilty, but the armed response will be effective in proportion to its overwhelming power. And these two responses—concession in one area, armed force in another—must be combined. To rely on either one without the other will ensure failure.

I have no doubt that some people will continue to denounce me. But I think I have explained myself to reasonable satisfaction.