From Free Life, Issue 17, January 1993
ISSN: 0260 5112

The case against abortion, as stated by Sean Gabb[1] may be sincerely believed, but it seems to me to be based on some logical and factual mistakes - I will avoid calling them "misconceptions" in this context!. The key ideas which are particularly relevant are Death, Murder, and Human Being.

Death is a peculiarly human preoccupation. It is often observed that human beings are the only species whose members deliberately kill each other. This observation is usually in the context of suggesting that human beings are uniquely capable of "evil". But the real reason is simply that no other species has the brain power sufficient to conceptualise a state of "death". For other species "out of sight is out of mind" so that when an enemy runs away or retires defeated he is no longer a stimulus and so produces no further reaction. When one animal kills another for food that is its only purpose - to get a meal - it doesn't "know", or care, that the other animal is dead or dying.

But humans realise that a temporarily vanquished enemy might return with additional support and reverse the previous result. The only sure solution is to make the enemy permanently incapable - that is to kill him.

The obverse is also recognised by individuals - that death is the permanent end for themselves. And that some other people might want to bring this about for their own reasons. Murder is singularly fascinating because, unlike any other crime, the victim has no means of restitution that can possibly satisfy him. The desire for severe penalties as deterrent is because it makes individuals feel sufficiently secure from possible enemies, including disgruntled or impatient relatives. For the fairly obvious reason of inducing acceptance, and avoiding arguments about special cases - such as revenge killings - the reason for the particular status of murder is presented as a principle such as "sanctity of human life".

This can lead to bizarre effects when some people take the official explanation seriously and insist that it does apply universally, including times of war, for instance. Going back to the real reason - personal anxiety about the behaviour of one's immediate neighbours - at least clarifies the situation. The people in the enemy camp are not a threat in the immediate day to day circumstances because they are separated geographically. This also means that they can be presented as so fundamentally different that the "rules" - such as sanctity of life do not apply to them. But it is a big logical hiatus. Recognising the real psychological reason for the particular aversion to killing "human life" is much clearer.

The point in relation to abortion is that neither an embryo nor a foetus is actually a human being in the sense of being able to think and conceptualise adequately to appreciate the nature of death and consequently fear it. The adults of an enemy state are certainly much more clearly human, and the only way of denying this is to claim that some aspect of their belief or behaviour divests them of this privilege. But that is also to admit that it is the possibility of having beliefs and presenting certain unique behaviour patterns that distinguishes human beings from other creatures.

A "thought experiment", as Einstein would call it, is instructive. Suppose that, several hundred million years ago, evolution had taken a somewhat different course and produced creatures resembling those imagined by some science fiction writers. Possibly such beings would reproduce by some other method, even - a realistic possibility - by laying eggs like birds and reptiles. But if they had also developed mental powers comparable (or even superior) to those of human beings, and in particular an appreciation of the significance of death, would they consequently have "rights to life" similar to those of human beings? Or would their lack of human form mean they could be treated "like animals" (more correctly, the way we treat other species)? And would their fertilised eggs (being "potential" adult creatures) have "rights" similar to those of the adults even though they were physically separate from the adults a long time before birth? As, by hypothesis, there would be no beings of human form, as distinct from abilities, then there could be no notions of "right to life" or even rights at all if we insist that such rights are confined to human forms. In other words there would be no point in trying to justify either specific rights, or the idea of rights in general, by any sort of rational or "absolute" argument, because they cannot exist anyway in the absence of human beings.

The "abortion problem" is a very good example of the lingering effect of pre-scientific and largely religious attitudes and beliefs. Before Copernicus" and Darwin's observations it was in fact fairly sensible to believe that the earth was the centre of the Universe specially created (by "God") for human beings. But this is no longer justifiable on any objective assessment of the evidence. The abortion issue is a good example of confusion arising from hanging on to outmoded and basically sentimental ideas about the supposedly cosmic significance of the human form, as distinct from the possibilities of enhancing general "happiness" by the development of the truly exceptional ability to think, communicate and exercise foresight.

Foresight is surely particularly relevant to abortion. Probably lack of it on the part of at least one person [more likely two] is the origin of it in individual cases. Exercising appropriate foresight would no doubt be helped by more realistic attitudes to sexual and parental responsi- bilities. The basic libertarian principle that actions must not significantly adversely affect other individuals surely applies with special force to producing children. This is the situation where opportunities for affecting other individuals - the children - are specially prevalent in both favourable and unfavourable directions. Surely no-one should be obliged to take on this responsibility unwillingly. In fact many of the willing parents are hardly ideal. When informed foresight indicates that a prospective human being is likely to be economically disadvantaged, neglected, or abused, which the prospective mother's desire for an abortion surely indicates, then abortion must be a desirable alternative, quite apart from any considerations of supposed principle - religious or libertarian.[2]

Notes

1. "Abortion: A Problem of Libertarian Ethics?", Free Life, No.16., May 1992.

2. For further consideration of this and related matters see my The Harm Done to Morality by the Idea of God, Atheist Notes No. 2, Libertarian Alliance, London, 1991.