From Free Life, Issue 18, May 1993
ISSN: 0260 5112
On Liberty in
Focus
John Gray and G.W. Smith
(ed.s)
Routledge, London, 1991, 286 pp., £12.50
(ISBN 0 415 01001 2)
I believe that one of the greatest strengths of libertarianism is the diverse range of thinkers in the tradition. Unlike in Marxism, there is no single authority figure at the head who is consulted for the Word of Truth. This gives us strength in depth - a big advantage over our collectivist opponents. We do not need gods or dogmatic leaders because we like to think for ourselves. Long may it stay that way.
No man had a greater understanding of the benefits of pluralism that John Stuart Mill. He was one of the leading defenders of freedom in the Victorian age and is still best remembered as the author of On Liberty, published in 1859. Looking back, that year seems to have been the high point of classical liberalism. It saw the deaths of two outstanding European defenders of classical liberalism - Alexis de Toqueville and Thomas Babbington Macaulay - and their near-deification in the resulting torrent of eulogistic obituaries. Yet high points are necessarily followed by decline. Why the doctrine should have peaked and declined, and not simply have moved serenely forward, is a complicated question. Yet Mill's defence of it has been cited as a factor. His utilitarianism could be seen as leading not to greater freedom, but to Fabian socialism.
I am not sure about this, but he was certainly an ambiguous, almost mercurial thinker, and I have difficulties with his utilitarianism and his messy distinction between "self-regarding" and "other- regarding" actions. My own brand of liberalism is based on a natural rights, neo-Objectivist base, and I believe that utility, though important, is not a sufficient foundation for freedom and harmonious human relations.
Interestingly, Mill seems at times to accept this in On Liberty. Far from defending freedom in a calculating way, the work is infused with moral passion. His stress on Man as a choice- making being, possessed of a particular nature which must be allowed to flourish in all its variety, has an Aristotelian flavour. And his obvious decency, uncompromising advocacy of free expression, and tolerance of unpopular beliefs is both admirable and hugely relevant in this age of political correctness and lifestyle Leninism.
It is therefore timely of Messrs Routledge to have brought out this new edition of the Essay together with seven commentary essays by academics such as Isaiah Berlin and John Gray. These writers grapple with the allegedly ambiguous nature of the work, and can be loosely divided into two camps: those who believe Mill's liberalism to have been broadly consistent with his utilitarianism; and those who perceive a fundamental contradiction.
The best approach is first to read On Liberty. Mill highlights the threatening nature of mass democracy, a theme similar to de Toqueville's concern about the "tyranny of the majority". He stresses the need for openness and variety in society, and constantly remarks on the dangers of zealous reformers, however benevolent their intentions. His remarks on free expression, tolerance of unorthodox beliefs and fear of bland mediocrity have timeless value.
But I am still trying to decide how coherent thinker he was. I am not sure how the commentary essays help my understanding. Some were very hard to grasp - I may be going senile. Dr Gray's essay, though, is quite helpful. He sees Mill as supporting a particular kind of "indirect" utilitarianism, and argues that he moved a long way from the strict utilitarianism of James Mill his father, and of Jeremy Bentham. There is little of the crude "Greatest Happiness of the Greatest Number" style of thought in On Liberty. Dr Gray also speculates that the idea of "autonomy" is crucial to linking the apparently conflicting elements of Mill's thought.
This seems quite plausible, but autonomy needs to be clearly defined. Yes, freedom, personal happiness and virtue go together - they make a very good case for libertarianism. But, lacking a clear definition of autonomy, and the boundaries necessary between persons, this argument is vague. In my view, no argument for liberty can work without a coherent conception of human rights, and in particular of property rights. Furthermore, human rights surely require some kind of morality which holds Man's right to live for his own sake as a sovereign being.
Mill does not understand the extent to which property rights are crucial to the question of autonomy and of Man as a volitional being. "Happiness" will mean whatever one wants it to mean unless based on social realities. But Mill wrote at a time when private property was more widely respected than now, so showing how property and liberty are intertwined - indeed, often synonymous - may not have seemed so pressing.
On the other hand, in another hugely influential work Principles of Political Economy, published in 1848, Mill makes the fatal distinction between production and distribution, something which opened the way to socialism and State controls on businessmen. This is extended in Chapter V of On Liberty, "Applications", with his assertion that
trade is a social act. Whoever undertakes to sell any description of goods to the public, does what affects the interest of other persons, and of society in general; and thus his conduct, in principle, comes within the jurisdiction of society.... [T]he... doctrine of Free Trade... rests on grounds different from, though equally solid with, the principle of individual liberty asserted in this Essay.[p. 109]
Nevertheless, I would still argue for Mill's status as one of the greatest liberals, and that his thinking may have been more coherent than some have claimed. He certainly appreciated the dangers of levelling socialism and mass democracy. As suggested, On Liberty does contain faults. Nevertheless, the present republication is well worth the effort of reading for anyone interested in one of the most important thinkers of the Victorian age. Debate over his contribution to liberalism will run and run.
Tom Burroughs