From Free Life, Issue 19, November 1993
ISSN: 0260 5112

Louisiana passes a law that "creation science" must be taught in schools alongside evolution as competing theories. A University of Michigan freshman is punished for saying that homosexuality is a disease treatable by therapy. Salman Rushdie is condemned to death for deeply offending Muslims. These are just three examples of what Jonathan Rauch sees as an international pattern of attacks on free thought, to which intellectuals have failed to give a coherent response, leading to new inquisitions "to identify and penalize false and socially dangerous opinions". [p.4]

Mr Rauch provides a passionate, thoughtful and elegant defence of free enquiry. It is an embarrassment that this should be left to a journalist (for National Journal) rather than an academic: indeed academia is where free enquiry may be most endangered, "an island of repression in a sea of freedom" according to Chester Finn. The book is of immense value to students (and to academics who have forgotten) as it explains the significance of abstract debates about epistemology for political and economic freedom, illustrated by numerous anecdotes.

He begins by identifying five rival principles of how to establish knowledge: [p.6]

The book is a defence of the liberal principle and a fierce attack on the others.

He sees "liberal science" as based on two principles: "No one gets the final say" (scepticism) and "No one has personal authority" (empiricism). [pp.48-49] It is largely based on Popper's fallibilism. As I explain to my students: "I know I'm wrong about some things. I just don't know which ones". Only through public criticism, or "checking out", as Rauch calls it, can we come to knowledge.

While demonstrating considerable empathy with the ideas and feelings of his opponents, he strongly attacks the alternative principles. He defines fundamentalism as "a strong disinclination to take seriously the notion that you might be wrong", [p.89] the desire for certainty, to be found beyond the religious. This attitude leads to closed societies, conversion or punishment, and logically to totalitarianism. Individuals have a right to be fundamentalist but not to expect society to act on their beliefs. Egalitarianism argues that because all are biased, no view deserves special standing. Rauch responds that "simply to believe is never to have knowledge". [p.160] It is the willingness to accept, and the ability to withstand, criticism which deserves special standing. Radical egalitarianism is attacked as pernicious because of its claim that some knowledge is only available to particular groups, e.g. blacks or women. This is fundamentally anti-egalitarian and anti-liberal because liberal science says that anyone can participate in the "checking".

Mr Rauch gives his greatest scorn for the humanitarian claim that speech must be prevented which "hurts", such as racist, anti- semitic or homophobic comments. He argues that because liberal science is public criticism, it cannot avoid offending. "Creating knowledge is painful, for the same reason that it can be exhilirating". [p.125] There is a right to offend and a responsibility to check and be checked. He is particularly hostile to the concept of "assaultive speech", that words are the same as bullets, a form of violence. He spends much effort rebutting the arguments for the various speech codes now widespread on American campuses (and more cautiously being introduced into the UK). The failure to confront this demonstrates that "Intellectuals are losing their nerve or their souls or both". [p.134]

Much as I enjoyed the book, it suffers from several weaknesses. First, it is repetitive and it needed a good editor. Second, Mr Rauch demonstrates no awareness of the criticisms of Popper's fallibilism. Third, he needs to engage directly with deconstructionism which currently underpins the attack on liberal science. Fourth, he only touches on one highly sensitive subject. He notes that a survey at the University of Buffalo found 60 per cent of students believing that some professors do not tolerate different beliefs. [p.147] The principle of academic freedom has sometimes been interpreted as no-one has a right to criticise my teaching, which is the opposite of liberal science. Everyone has a right to criticise your teaching. The issue is whether anyone has the right to force you to teach differently. The issue bias in teaching is one that no-one is willing to address. Finally, Mr Rauch should have emphasised that the recognition that one may be wrong is not an excuse for inaction or indecision. Action with imperfect knowledge is inevitable. It is the unwillingness to recognise it (if only to oneself) that is wrong. We need to introduce into public life the opportunity to admit error without condemnation.

This is a wonderful book in that its ideas are expressed in its spirit as well as its words. The conclusion was even moving as the author explained his defence of Holocaust revisionists to express their views (although not to claim it as knowledge) and of the student who thought homosexuality a disease, while acknowledging the pain it gave him as a Jewish, gay man. This eloquent defence of free thought deserves to be read.

Nigel Ashford