As well as Sean Gabb on free will, see also Antony Flew's reply to this article, plus those of Kevin McFarlane, Ben Best, Danny Frederick, and Nicholas Dykes.

Kevin McFarlane considers it impossible to advocate both determinism and free will. Yet this is exactly the position which has most commonly been taken by philosophers - most notably by David Hume. Since terminology is so critical to this debate, it is wise to begin with a discussion of terms.
 
 

Determinism is the view that all events have causes. Although New Agers delight in the belief that quantum theory disproves physical determinism, they refer only to the Copenhagen Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics. Schroedinger, Einstein, Bohm, Penrose and many other physicists have never accepted the claim that quantum theory disproves determinism. Moreover, nearly everyone agrees that even if quantum uncertainty is a reality, it can do no more than establish random will, not free will. Thus, no materialist argument is of value to justify a causeless will.
 
 

In fact, the argument for a causeless will necessarily rejects materialism and seeks spiritual reasons - because "spiritual reasons" are not really reasons at all. They are excuses for not having reasons, and for engaging in wishful thinking.
 
 

The word "freedom" does not mean "freedom from causality or materialism", it means "freedom from compulsion or restraint". Thus, if will exists, it can exert its influences through causal relations. Causality provides constraints, not unfreedom. Gravity limits the conditions under which a person can fly, but does not prevent flying. The causal sequences by which nerve stimulation results in muscular action give the will the freedom to manifest itself in the world.
 
 

And what is the will? It is simply the sum of a person's desires, motives and tendencies (with a material basis in the human brain). Does the will exist? Yes! Is it entirely the causal product of genetics and developmental environment? Yes, that follows from materialism. Is it entirely controlled by external influences? No. Control implies ongoing compulsion. Although the will was created by causal factors, once it has come into existence it becomes a control centre (rather than a marionette on strings). In other words, the will is free. Only when a will cannot manifest its intentions (desires, motives and tendencies) is it unfree.
 
 

An apple tree, although the product of prior causes, is nonetheless a well-defined entity which produces apples. Similarly, an oyster produces pearls and a will (human or animal) produces choices and actions. All choices and actions are the product of desires, motives and tendencies. To justify a causeless will on the grounds that a person can choose what he or she does not really wish to choose (wills what is not really willed) is self-contradictory. And this is not freedom. It is chance.

These facts in no way undermine the realities of deliberation, effort or a sense of duty. A person's will is composed of many desires and many kinds of desires (and fears) which can come in conflict. A person may choose not to eat "junk food" because the desire for good health outweighs the desire for momentary gratification. A person's desire to fulfill a duty may outweigh the desire for entertainment - or vice versa. Often deliberation - and effort - plays a role in these choices. Bodily reflexes incline a person to withdraw a hand from hot water, but interneurons from higher brain centres can allow someone to keep a hand in hot water.
 
 

David Kelly has argued the Objectivist position against determinism, claiming that determinism precludes knowledge and ethics. He implies that determinism means that choices can only be made on subjective, not objective considerations. But the material, causal human brain has the capacity to use reason and assess a situation apart from vested interests and immediate desire - and such an ability has survival value. To equate determinism with whim and subjectivity is simply a smear. That reason and reality influence choices is not inconsistent with determinism.
 
 

Does determinism preclude moral responsibility? Not for me. I want to deal with people who are trustworthy and dependable - people of good character. I am reluctant to praise or blame someone whose actions are erratic and inexplicable. If I am injured by a person who is under the influence of alcohol, I may conclude that I can trust that person not to injure me when sober. But if I conclude that a man injures me because he was sexually abused as a child, I still hold him to be the source of my injury - and to be regarded with circumspection, despite whatever pity I may feel. Holding him responsible for his actions is primarily a matter of concern for myself and those I care about - especially in view of his possible future behaviour.
 
 

Determinism does not imply complete predictability or a denial of creativity. Whether flipping a coin will result in heads or tails is an obviously deterministic mechanical process, but predicting the outcome is inordinately difficult. The human brain contains 100 billion neurons, many of which have the potential to connect with thousands of other neurons. The complexity of the system allows for creativity and precludes absolute prediction - especially with current technology.
 
 

In sum, claims against determinism rarely contain much explanation of the workings of the alternative. Causelessness cannot be the source of a will, free or unfree. Arguments that the will does not act in accordance with desire usually imply motives which are not acknowledged to be desires. A free and morally responsible will is created-by and exists-in an entirely causal world.