From Free Life, Issue 20, August 1994
ISSN: 0260 5112

Do animals have rights? If not, do we nevertheless have duties towards them? If not, do we have duties to people which impose moral restrictions on the way in which we behave towards animals?

Before we can give answers to any of these questions, it seems we need to answer some others. What are the attributes of people that give rise to their having rights, or to our having duties towards them? In what sense, if any, do these attributes belong to animals?

Baldly stated, Mr Leahy's answers are along the following lines. To have moral rights one must have self-consciousness, an awareness of choice, and a sense of right and wrong. Why? Lots of reasons. Here are some. A right is something you can exercise; to exercise a right you must have a capacity to make a deliberate choice, ie. to reflect on your reasons for taking one course of action as opposed to another; and this implies that you have an awareness of choice and a conception of yourself (the capacity to think I, as in eg. "what should I do?"). Further, rights imply duties in two senses. If you have a right, then other moral agents have a duty to respect your right; and second, you have a duty to respect the corresponding rights of others. You need therefore an awareness of duty and thus a sense of right and wrong.

It follows that animals do not have rights, for they do not have self-consciousness (or a sense of justice or of choice, which depend upon self-consciousness). How do we know? Because, despite some spurious claims to the contrary, animals cannot talk; and without the capacity for language, they could not develop this conception of themselves.

Further, the lack of self-consciousness impoverishes the whole "inner life" of animals. There are a whole range of mental states which people have, but which an animal in similar circumstances could not have, despite the similarities in behaviour. Fear, hope, disappointment, desire, intention, guilt, and so on and so forth, can be attributed to animals only metaphorically. The same goes even for suffering:

Animals react in predictable ways to pain. They squeal, whimper, and lick the affected part; when the pain abates all is as before. Its "suffering" is uncomplicated. But it is otherwise with the afflicted human being. The slightest twinge or discomfort can occasion chronic concern over a prognosis, remedy, or treatment. Such distress is alien to the animal kingdom. The presence of self-consciousness guarantees that we are prone to a range and intensity of suffering light-years from that of brute beasts. (p. 256)

The claims of animal liberationists depend on an anthropomorphic misunderstanding of the nature of animals. To make plausible their case for animal rights, or our extensive duties towards animals, they have to assimilate animals to humans, ascribing to them a depth of experience, and a range of capacities, that they simply cannot have.

Does it follow that we have no duties towards animals? Mr Leahy does not go quite this far. For animals do experience pain; and we have a natural impulse to help people and other creatures which are in pain. Further, says Mr Leahy, our judgments of right and wrong are grounded in our natural impulses. This leads him to an attenuated sense in which we have a duty to avoid causing animals unnecessary suffering (attenuated because "duty" in its primary use applies to relations between moral agents).

Mr Leahy draws the following practical conclusions. First, eating meat is unobjectionable so long as the animals are transported with care and killed painlessly. Indeed, even factory farming is justified as a practical necessity to meet demand. All that is required is strict regulations governing the humane treatment of animals raised for food. Such regulations already exist in most western countries. Second, experimentation that conforms to the legal regulations is justified by the benefits that flow from the research, even though it sometimes involves the infliction of pain without an anaesthetic. Third, other practices to which liberationists object can be justified in a similar way. Zoos entertain the public, and the animals in them live a pampered life compared to their counterparts in the wild. Bloodsports do not merely provide pleasure for their devotees, they also ensure that the species pursued, and their natural habitats, are conserved. The majority of animals used for fur are specially farmed for the purpose and can be humanely killed; and even the clubbing of seals by expert trappers is a very quick despatch; but leg-hold traps which cause painful suffering ought to be outlawed.

The greatest problem I have with Mr Leahy's account is that the notion of unnecessary suffering is very slippery. To begin with, if we can justify killing animals because some people take pleasure in wearing their fur, or in eating their flesh, then why couldn't we justify killing animals because some people take pleasure in killing animals? The suffering of animals is necessary so that people can use cosmetics; but then, since some people take pleasure in watching animals suffer in agony, the pain of those animals will be necessary for the delight of the watchers (who are not therefore causing unnecessary suffering).

I think that to avoid such conclusions Mr Leahy would appeal to Kant (pp.180-186) and say that we have a duty to cultivate a humane disposition, which is incompatible with enjoying the pain or death of animals for its own sake. However, even if we accept this, the slippery notion of "unnecessary suffering" leads to other problems.

If we are going to kill an animal for food, and if we can easily kill it painlessly, then to give it an agonising death would be to cause it unnecessary suffering. But what if killing it painlessly involved significant expense in terms of money and/or time? Its suffering would then be necessary in order to avoid the expense. Since every minute or penny spent avoiding pain to animals could be spent instead on something else (eg. better heating or housing), inflicting the pain will always be justifiable as necessary in order to achieve these other goals; in which case it will follow that we should avoid causing pain to animals only when it costs us nothing to do so.

In this light, let us consider the legal regulations governing the humane treatment of animals, of which Mr Leahy approves. Their effect is to force people to devote considerable resources to avoiding the suffering of animals when these resources could instead be used for relieving human suffering from hunger, pain, disease, and all the rest of it. That people are compelled to divert resources in this way is surely a moral obscenity.

It seems to me that the only sensible and consistent position is to say that you can do what you like with animals so long as they are your property. Of course, most of us are humane and sympathetic people who would not be inclined to cause animals pain, or death, for the sake of it. But if a minority get their kicks that way, then provided they are using only their own property, what right have we to interfere? Though we would have every right to shun their company. And if we really want to spend our time and money alleviating suffering, there are many human cases to which we can devote our attention.

Further, all the "humane" legislation which imposes additional costs on our use of animals should be repealed: each person (or business) should be allowed to decide how best to use his/her own animals in the light of his/her own particular circumstances (the competing demands for his/her available resources). Those who are able and willing to make sacrifices for the sake of avoiding pain to animals would then be able to do so (as they do now with, eg., "cruelty-free" products). Others who are not so fortunate (or so sympathetic) would at least be able to pursue the course of action best suited to their own circumstances.

This is not tantamount to treating animals like things. It means treating animals like animals, ie. recognising that they do have some capacity for suffering and taking this into account (ie. giving it some weight) when trying to deal with all the demands that are made upon us. Sometimes, and regrettably, animals will just have to suffer; and if the law rules that out, then the law is an ass.

Danny Frederick