I propose here to reply to Antoine Clarke's "Abortion: A Technical Problem" [Free Life No. 24, December 1995].

First, my suspicions about the rational basis of Mr Clark's argument were aroused when he seriously attempted to link abortion to the Nazi 'philosophy' and Dr. Mengele in particular. The Nazis may have approved of, or even insisted on, abortion as a consequence of their racial philosophy, but it does not follow that therefore everybody who approves of or condones abortion also approves of or condones Nazi behaviour.  Evil people can misuse both ideas and technicalities.  Mr Clarke reveals a close association with the Roman Church - an association notoriously difficult to expunge. That Church was historically responsible for the Inquisition and also many attempts to suppress dissent and open discussion, as well as recent examples of cover-ups for the misbehaviour of its priests towards children and women, in particular.  And it disapproves of abortion in any circumstances. But I will not use the association of the Church of Rome with the anti-abortionists as an argument for abortions.

So let's forget associations and consider the situation rationally, and under Mr. Clarke's headings.

1. THE MOTHER'S HEALTH

The argument here seems to assume that protection of the mother's health is the main argument for abortions. But the 'health argument' was a red herring in the first place, undoubtedly introduced to exploit the irrational weighting given to health considerations in present day discussions. By including 'mental health' it was possible to establish, effectively, abortion on demand and so 'get round' the religious and moral objections.

But I would maintain that abortion on demand (provided the economic cost was met by whoever wanted it) should have been the accepted situation without 'excuses' about health. Health is in fact a 'secondary good' anyway in the sense that it is desired to enable the healthy person to achieve ends that are not possible for the unhealthy. [Those people who do apparently pursue health as an end in itself are, rightly, regarded as 'freaks' and the vast majority of people do, in fact, sacrifice some aspects of health for ends they consider more important - good food, smoking, career ambitions, notoriety, political influence, to name but a few].  So if the potential mother decides that some aims of hers are more important than perfect health;  and possible adverse effects on her health of bearing a child are a justification for abortion, then these other aims are even stronger justifications for abortion.

Another feature of Mr Clarke's article is that nowhere is there any mention of the views of the unwillingly pregnant women. This is very patronising. Any supposedly moral arguments should surely be directed first at them not at lawmakers and technicians.

So far as his argument is concerned it is invalidated by two major errors in the form of implied premises, neither of which is specifically stated.

First, he persistently begs a fundamental question by referring to any foetus as a child or a 'life' with the implication that it is of equal quality or significance as that of any human - adult or born child. This is a confusion which anti-abortionists persistently try to encourage. It can only be justified on the mystical religious hypothesis that human beings, in particular, have some inherently special quality such as a 'soul' which is a consequence of divine favour and somehow appears on conception. Whatever historical or emotional attractiveness this theory has, it is completely superfluous to any objective theory of human existence and development, both of which are substantially accounted for by evolution and developmental psychology.

No objective criteria could possibly identify a foetus with an adult human or a child. The capacity for independent existence by breathing and feeding, for example, is absent; and the lack of sensory contact with the environment precludes the development of any recognisable individual personality (in the sense of a unique set of reactions to, and effects on, the environment including other individuals of course).

Secondly he seems to take it for granted that the fact that the foetus is dependent on the mother somehow puts her under an inescapable obligation to nurture it irrespectively of her own desires. But such a condition is not applied in any other, broadly similar, circumstances. It is quite possible, for instance, that conditions could arise where someone, adult or child, was desperately in need of my blood to save their life. Though I might feel under some moral obligation to give some blood (and suffer some inconvenience and slight, but real, danger to myself from a vasovagal inhibition, for instance) nobody would suggest that I should be compelled to do so. I could object on the grounds that I hated the person involved anyway (corresponding to the child of rape) through having a phobia about blood and needles, to having something to do that I thought more important.  But I would really have no need of  such 'excuses' - "just don't want to" is quite sufficient, even though such an attitude might do my reputation some harm.

SOME PROVISIONAL CONCLUSIONS

Mr Clarke's provisional conclusions seem almost entirely perverse. The medical profession might well often bias its comments and 'health promotion' to its own prestige enhancement and financial advantage, but abortion is certainly not in this category. Some still refuse it, and when 'easy' methods first became available (say around 1955) quite a few gynaecologists refused to do itve been one other person involved in any pregnancy in the form of the father - quite often a much more willing participant than the mother, initially.  But this participant can literally 'walk away from his responsibilities', so why should not the balance ve been one other person involved in any pregnancy in the form of the father - quite often a much more willing participant than the mother, initially.  But this participant can literally 'walk away from his responsibilities', so why should not the balance of responsibilities be equalised by technology when 'nature' (God?) has so conspicuously failed in this elementary moral duty?

Far from reducing moral responsibility the availability of safe abortion - so long as the decisions about it are made by the women involved without interference from righteous outsiders who think they know better than she does- should increase that responsibility because it is no longer credible to regard any birth as unwanted or an 'accident'.