In the last issue of Free Life [No. 24, December 1995], Antoine Clarke presents a very muddled argument against abortion. For example in his second sentence he claims that "to destroy a live foetus is no different from compulsory euthanasia for the mentally handicapped". However, even if you consider abortion to be murder, the destruction of one foetus is different from compulsory euthanasia for the mentally handicapped - that is, murdering all mentally handicapped. Mr Clarke may argue that the destruction of one foetus is the same as killing a mentally handicapped person. Alternatively, compulsory abortion, on  whatever grounds, may be compared to compulsory euthanasia. The crucial, and only, argument being made is that the same moral principle applies before and after birth - conception is the moment from which the moral principle applies. That this is Mr Clarke's argument is made clear later in his article when he talks of developments in medical technology that enable doctors to save babies born prematurely who would once have died. These developments mean that the mother is no longer needed to keep the baby alive. Mr Clarke is correct to point out that there is not an obvious and permanent time period from conception after which the nature of the moral problem changes. However, his suggestion that the moral problem is identical throughout the full period from conception to birth is wrong.

In his second paragraph, Mr Clarke claims that "a libertarian philosophy [is] a philosophy that rejects determinism, behaviourism, and utilitarianism". Contrary to this claim, however, there is not one 'libertarian philosophy' but a number of philosophical defences of libertarianism from philosophers with very different perspectives. In particular, some libertarian philosophers provide consequentialist, and even utilitarian, defences of libertarianism. It is more fruitful to view libertarianism as a social theory which views the state as the greatest infringer of individual liberty and therefore defends either a very limited government or anarchy (that is, no state). As far as I understand libertarianism it involves a rejection of government financing of and support for abortion. And, while abortion remains a controversial moral issue, libertarians would also have to reject a government ban on performing abortions. There are a number of people who consider killing animals, or at least other mammals, to be murder. Would Mr Clarke come to their defence as strongly as he does to the anti-abortionists? Moral positions differ over time. Abortion is one issue that, partly due to the improvements in technology that Mr Clarke mentions, has become more controversial. Libertarianism, as a social theory, provides no obvious defence for either side of the argument.

It is quite ironic, given his rejection of utilitarianism as collectivist, that there is a collectivist mentality running throughout Mr Clarke's article. He tells us that there are two principles that may be applied (by whom?): triage or children first. The one person who seems to have no say in the decision over which of these principles is chosen is the pregnant woman herself! Mr Clarke constantly talks as if abortion decisions are made by a group of abortionists and the mothers just happen to be carriers of the aborted foetus. To quote : "If the mother won't give birth, the foetus can be removed at a stage where it can be reared". But what if the mother doesn't want to carry the foetus until it is old enough to 'be removed'? Even supposing she does, to be reared by whom? At whose expense? Would the central planner assign the child to a family to be reared, paid for with the collective resources at his disposal?

Although Mr Clarke rejects consequentialist arguments as collectivist, I believe that they are useful in shedding some light on the issue of state involvement in abortion. In a society where a large number of people do not consider abortion to be murder, what would be the consequences of making abortion illegal? As has been demonstrated by the 'war on drugs', making an activity illegal does not get rid of it. The demand for abortions would not disappear simply by making it illegal. The consequences would be a choice between very expensive abortions or badly performed, back street abortions. The worst doctors, those willing to risk losing their license, perhaps due to their failure in legal medicine, would be drawn, attracted by the higher income, into the supply of abortion services. The women who would suffer most would be the poorest, some unable to afford even these qualified doctors resorting to unqualified practitioners.

Since there are many couples keen to adopt, making women with unwanted pregnancies aware of adoption as an alternative to abortion is a better way to discourage abortion. If women were allowed to be paid for giving up their baby, adoption would become an appealing alternative to abortion, particular if state funding for abortion was removed and the woman, or her insurance company, would have to cover the costs. Indeed, insurance companies might be encouraged to offer counselling services to women deciding in favour of having their baby adopted as opposed to aborted. Both financial and public-relations incentives make this a highly probable market outcome.

Mr Clarke treats abortion as a decision made by the medical profession, rather than, most of the time, being a personal decision made by a pregnant woman. It is true that the incentives facing women and the GPs from whom they receive their medical advice are influenced by the heavy regulation and centralisation of the medical profession. This may create a bias towards abortion over other solutions to unwanted pregnancies (and my limited experience of the medical profession gives me the impression it does).

Mr Clarke concludes that "Given the choice between a law - compulsory and harsh - applied through the courts which prevents the killings and the pseudo-freedom of a corporatist web of vested interests, I will reluctantly accept the former overt Statist position. The greatest long term threat to freedom is not dictatorship or arbitrary rule which are overt, but the insidious worship of the common good." However, introducing a law against abortion would do nothing to remove the corporatist web of vested interests. Indeed, it might strengthen it along the lines of the ex-Soviet Union, making only those doctors with the right connections in the legal system immune to prosecution. Given only a choice between a misguided attempt - based on an ignorance of economics to bring about the common good through the corporatist, welfare state -  and arbitrary rule by dictators with Mr Clarke's lack of tolerance, I would gladly defend the former. Fortunately, contrary to the impression Mr Clarke gives, there is nothing to prevent libertarians rejecting both of these alternatives and consistently defending and arguing for individual liberty.