Now that the big boys toys have been put back in the cupboard and Mr Jamie Shea is returning to run his whelk stall in the Mile End Road, we really do need to ask what was this bizarre act of aggression by NATO was about because it has profound implications for Britain. What was it all about? Well, we all know that, don't we? To put the Albanians back into Kossovo, stupid!. Wrong! The war started  because Mr Milosevic would not accept the NATO proposals drawn up at Rambouillet, which was scarcely surprising for  they might have been designed to ensure their refusal.

Not only did the Rambouillet Proposals give foreign soldiers the right to enter any part of Yugoslavia, they provided for a referendum on independence for the Kossovan population. Add to that the demand that Serb troops withdraw from Kossovo and the refusal to allow Russian troops to be part of a peacekeeping force, and  it is all too easy to see why Mr Milosevic refused them. Moreover, the Rambouillet proposals  were not put forward as a basis for negotiation, but as a fait accompli which eventually became the subject of a naked ultimatum issued effectively by the US in the egregious person of Madeleine Albright.

The Rambouillet proposals would have reduced Yugoslavia to the status of a dependent territory, with the virtual guarantee that the land (Kossovo) which had the greatest emotional significance for the majority Serb population would be lost to the hated Albanian minority. Moreover, they had the knowledge that the loss of Kossovo through a referendum would almost certainly result in the expulsion of the two hundred thousand Serbs normally resident in Kossovo, assuming that they had not already left after the withdrawal of Serbian troops.  Mr Milosevic was offered the prospect of tremendous humiliation and nothing else. If NATO had wished to ensure a war they could scarcely have done better. As Henry Kissinger remarked in a interview with Boris Johnson of The Daily Telegraph (28th June 1999,) Rambouillet was a provocation.

But the Rambouillet proposals were only the immediate cause of the conflict. The war was really about the imposition of Liberal Internationalist ideals.   Since 1945, the Liberal Internationalist cause have been growing in strength until it has become the ostensible ideology of the ruling élites throughout the West. During the Cold War the territorial ambitions of the Liberal Internationalists were considerably  constrained. Since 1989 those constraints have been removed. The result has been an unhappy sequence of interventions, covered by  the fig leaf of  UN colours,  which have demonstrated  the  utter  impotence  of  the Liberal Internationalist creed by invariably creating situations the exact opposite of those intended by the interveners:  Somalia is a mess of anarchy, Bosnia a UN protectorate with the warring ethnic groups largely segregated and future conflict just waiting to happen. The war against Serbia marked a new stage  in  Liberal  Internationalist  ambitions:  naked aggression was undertaken without even the indecent cover of the UN fig leaf.

The persistent failure of international intervention has not deterred the Liberal Internationalists because, like all fanatic ideologues,  the Liberal  Internationalist  is incapable of admitting that his creed is plain wrong  no matter have often events prove it to be so. For the Liberal Internationalist  any failure is simply the result  of insufficient resources and time, a spur to behave in an ever more totalitarian manner; from peacekeeping through outright  war to de facto colonial occupation. Consequently those with the power in the West continue to intervene ineptly in conflicts inherently irresolvable in liberal Internationalist terms. Their response to failure or the contrary evidence of events is to embark on ever more intervention regardless of the havoc caused or the long term consequences.

What the war was not about was morality, despite Messrs Blair and Clinton's inordinate and deeply risible posturing. (In fact war is never about morality. It is always about territory, aggrandisement,  the removal of competitors and  the imposition of the victor's will.) The nations  attacking Yugoslavia had stood by during many greater man made horrors such as the massacres in Rwanda. Most pertinently, the West had not merely stood by while hundreds of thousands of Serbs were expelled from Croatia, but in the guise of the UN had actively assisted in that expulsion by providing arms and air power to support the Croat military. Most tellingly, and most repellently,  because it was utterly predictable, NATO has not meaningfully protected the Kosovan Serbs since the end of the war. Nor could they have had any reasonable expectation of doing so, for the size of even the projected peace keeping force (50,000 - which numbers have not been met)  was obviously inadequate to mount a general police action against an Albania population of nearly two million in which there were plentiful arms. A cynic might think that NATO's aims were from the beginning to produce a Kossovo ethnically cleansed of Serbs.

The  course  of  the war  laid  bare  the  stupidity, incomprehension, incompetence  and amorality of the NATO members' leaders.  The objective facts say that the conflict has greatly worsened a naturally fraught situation. Before the war, the vast majority of the Albanian population of Kossovo was in Kossovo living in their homes. Since the war began the, vast majority have either left the country or remain in Kossovo having been driven from their homes.  Thus, just as the Second World War signalled the beginning of the Holocaust, so NATO's action signalled that of the Albanian tragedy.  Without the war, it is improbable to the point of certainty that the greatest movement of a  population in Europe since 1945 would have occurred.

To the tragedy of the Albanians must be added that of the Serbs whose fate is to be the pariah nation of the West. The attitude of the Western élites towards Serbs illustrates their double standards.  Where is the morality in imposing sanctions against a state which does not threaten any outside its borders? Where is the morality of reducing a state to penury?  Where  is the morality of bombing defenceless civilians.

The  hypocrisy of the whole business  was  graphically demonstrated in the NATO members' attitude towards the refugees. The public posturing on the need to provide for the refugees was all too clearly balanced by the fear that any large scale import of refugees to NATO countries outside the Balkans would arouse considerable dissent in those countries. Amongst many stomach heaving moments,  Clare Short's protestations that Britain did not want to move the refugees away from the Balkans simply because Britain did not wish unwillingly to assist Mr Milosevic rank very high. The double standards, both amongst politicians and the media  have continued with the end of the war, as the Liberal Ascendency quietly tolerates ethnic cleansing of the Kossovo Serbs and the gross acts of revenge taken by the Kossovo Albanians.

What if there had been no war? Judged by what had gone before,  there would  have been continued harassment of Kossovo Albanians by Serb paramilitaries and some action by the regular Serb forces, the latter primarily directed  against the KLA. One simple fact alone gives the lie to NATO's claims that wholesale ethnic cleansing would have occurred regardless of NATO intervention. Prior to the war, Mr Milosevic  had ten years to undertake the task and did not attempt it. Fine ideals are not fine at all if they are so out of keeping with reality that they produce evil ends.

Who won the war? Well, let us follow the Dragnet example and just look at the facts.  Mr Milosevic remains in control of Yugoslavia minus Kossovo. Two of the prime demands of the Rambouillet proposals - that the Kossovo population be given a referendum on independence within three years and the right of peacekeeping troops to go anywhere in Yugoslavia - have been dropped. There is also to be no referendum and the peacekeeping force will operate only within Kossovo. In addition, Russian troops are involved in the peacekeeping force,  a token Serb presence will be allowed in Kossovo and there are signs that the force may eventually come under UN not NATO auspices. Those are very significant political gains for Mr Milosevic.

To the formal concessions granted to Mr Milosevic may be added the  new facts on the ground. Northern Kossovo has almost certainly been shorn of Albanians. Much of the rest of Kossovo has been, if the refugees' stories are given credence,  made uninhabitable through the destruction of buildings and the despoliation of farming land. Hundreds of thousands of Albanians are refugees outside Kossovo. As many or more are homeless within southern Kossovo and remain within the region simply because they have been unable to leave. How many will return is still uncertain. Nor even if the majority do return is it clear how long they will require outside assistance simply to live. The omens are not auspicious.

Let us make the assumptions which most favour NATO. That the agreement which was reached between Mr Milosevic and NATO was not ambiguous. That Mr Milosevic will keep his word. That the peace keeping force will be NATO led  under a unified command. That the Russians involved in the peace keeping will not subvert the process on the ground. That money will be forthcoming in sufficient amounts to rebuild Kossovo. That the KLA will allow themselves to be disarmed. A collection of pretty improbable occurrences. But no matter, let us grant them. What then?

Even under such propitious and unlikely circumstances, it is highly improbable that Kossovo will be quickly returned to normality.  The destruction of housing and the spoliation of farm land alone make that immensely difficult, but given the will and the money, the material damage might be repaired. But material renaissance is not the heart of the problem. That lies in the all too simple fact of the existence of two incompatible ethnic groups occupying the same territory, both sides replete with ancestral hatreds and recent hurts. In such circumstances a peaceful multicultural Kossovo is a fantasy.

We have the example of Bosnia before us. Stripped of all cant, it is now a good old fashioned League of Nations Protectorate, a mandated territory. It has the experience of several years of UN control. Yet the vast majority of the displaced populations in Bosnia have not returned to their homes and the various ethnic groups there lead largely segregated lives.

But the post bombing situation in Kossovo is unlikely to be anything like so favourable as I have described. Mr Milosevic can reasonably claim that he cannot control Serb irregulars in Kossovo. The KLA show no more willingness to disarm than the IRA. The agreement which was reached is not unambiguous. Mr Milosevic cannot be relied to keep his part of the bargain. The Russians have shown that they are not willing to  accept NATO command unconditionally.  Money in the  quantities suggested as needed for rebuilding (anything between £15-25 billion) may well prove to be too great a hurdle for politicians to sell to their publics who are being told of the need for cuts in welfare - The USA and Europe are already squabbling over who should bear the cost of rebuilding Kossovo.

Mr Milosevic also has one great general political advantage; he knows that political life amongst the NATO powers  is ephemeral. While he may be in power in five years time, the majority of his opponents will not. He can afford to sit and wait until a propitious moment comes to regain all or part of Kossovo. Mr Milosevic's position is not as strong as that of Saddam Hussain in purely authoritarian terms, but he has a vital quality which Saddam does not, namely  his authority does not rely entirely on force.

What is the most likely outcome of the western led occupation of Kossovo? At best we can expect to be a replica of Bosnia. At worst  the western disregard shown for the welfare of ordinary Serbs elsewhere in the Balkans will be repeated  and the peacekeeping force stand idly by whilst Kossovo is cleansed of Serbs by the KLA and their associates. We shall probably get something in between the two with the Serbs holding the northernmost part of Kossovo in fact if not in name, and the Albanians the rest, which it should be noted is  what Mr Milosevic most probably wanted.  Perhaps no one has won the war, but that is often the way of wars. The real question is who has suffered the most damage. At the moment it may look like Mr Milosevic, not least because the NATO countries in truth had nothing material to gain and everything to lose from the War. Yet Mr Milosevic has reduced the Rambouillet demands, probably tightened his control on Yugoslav politics and large parts of Kossovo has  been ethnically  cleansed.  The NATO  countries  have  made significant concessions and committed themselves to massive expenditure and the deployment of troops indefinitely. This will both take money from their own electorates and influence their future foreign policies.  It is a strange sort of victory if victory it be for NATO.

For Britain there is much about which to be ashamed and worried. We have bombed defenceless targets which plainly were not in any meaningful sense military. This places us in an impossible moral position in dealing with terrorist action.  What moral argument could we have against Serb reprisal bombs in Britain? That it is wrong to bomb innocent civilians?

More worryingly, Mr Blair has shown himself to be an unashamed warmonger. I would like to believe that his public words were simply a cynical manipulation of the public to promote his reputation and were made in the certain knowledge that Mr Clinton would not commit troops to a land war. Unfortunately I think  that Mr Blair was anything but cynical in  his belligerence. Given the opportunity I am certain that he would have committed the majority of Britain's armed forces to a land war regardless of the cost,  deaths and injuries. The danger remains that he will find another adventure which does result in a land war. Over Kossovo, he behaved  like a reckless adolescent and nearly came a fatal political cropper.  Yet this government appears to have learnt nothing from the experience, vide the unpleasant and malicious fanaticism in Messrs Blair and Cook's declarations of their intent  both to unseat Mr Milosevic from power and to bring him before an international court, vide the humiliation of Russia, vide the ever more absurd declarations of internationalist intent since hostilities ceased. That adolescent idealists' mind set could lead Britain down a very dark path indeed. It is also incompatible with a foreign policy that supposedly encourages elected  governments (however imperfect they are)  over dictatorships.

What other lessons does this war teach us? It shows above all  the utter powerlessness of the democratic process and the sham of international law. In the two countries which have taken the lead, US and Britain,  parliamentary support was not formally sought nor given,  funds voted or a declaration of war sanctioned. The other members of NATO have been impotent bystanders.

The American Constitution was designed to prevent aggressive acts  of  war  without  congressional  approval.  That constitutional guarantee has been severely tested since 1945, but perhaps never so emphatically as in the past months. If an American president can commit such considerable forces to a war regardless of Congressional approval,  it seriously brings into  question  the value of the constitutional restraint. Where exactly would the line be drawn in the Constitutional sand?

As for Britain, the matter has been debated at  the Government's convenience but at no one else's. Incredibly, many will think, support for the war was never put to a vote in the Commons.

As for international law, that has been shown in the most unambiguous manner to be a sham. The war was fought without a declaration of war, in contravention of the UN Charter and in a manner guaranteed to cause significant civilian casualties. Yet Judge Arbour at the War Crimes Tribunal does not indict the likes of Messrs Clinton and Blair, only Mr Milosevic. Law which is not equally applied is no law, but merely a tool of the powerful against the weak. Moreover, there does not appear to be any illegality at which the US would draw the line. Apart from incitements to murder Mr Milosevic, there have been newspaper reports of attempts by the CIA illegally to enter Mr Milosevic's bank accounts and drain them of funds (we honest folks call that theft). If governments do not obey the core moral and legal commandments of their own societies, law does not effectively exist.

Balkan history tells a single story:  any of its peoples which become possessed of the advantage of numbers, wealth or arms will oppress as a matter of course any other of its peoples. If the Albanians gain control of Kossovo, rest assured that they will behave as abominably towards the Serbs as the Serbs have behaved towards them. The disputed territory is Serb by history and Albanian by present settlement. There is no absolute right on either side.

What can be done to minimize ethnic conflict? The starting point must be human nature. This is what Liberal Internationalism ignores, because it treats individuals as atoms outside  any social context. Human beings are designed by Nature to live in small bands. Genuine nations are an extension of this fact. What human beings do not find easy or natural is life in circumstances where they have no fixed social context. That should be the starting point for the international solution of any ethnic conflict. Liberal Internationalism is a fantasy held with religious intensity  and because of this its imposition will necessarily be both grossly oppressive and immensely harmful.