Report on Conditions in The Czecho-Slovak Federative Republic

Population: 15,683,234 (July 1991), of which 54.10% Czechs, 31.00% Slovaks, 8.70% Moravians, 3.80% Hungarians, 2.40% others.

Capital of Federal and Czech Republics, Prague (1,215,000 - July 1991). Capital of Slovak Republic, Bratislava (445,000 - July 1991).

Electricity: 220v AC, 50 Hz in most places. However, some areas of Prague still use 110v AC.

Currency: Koruna, or Crown. 100 Heller to the Crown. Notes issued in denominations of 1,000, 500, 100, 50, 20 and 10 Crowns (Kcs). Coins issued in denominations of 10, 5, 2 and 1 Kcs; and 50, 20, 10 and 5 Heller.

Since the Monetary reforms of January 1991,the Crown has remained stable at 27-31 to the US$ (approx Kcs50 = 1 Pound Sterling). Inflation during the year ending April 1992 was around 2%. Although it is still technically inconvertible for private Czechoslovak citizens, the black market rate for the Crown is not more than 5% above the official rate. The old requirement for foreign visitors to change a fixed amount of hard currency each day into Crowns has been abolished.

Czechoslovakia shares borders to the west with Germany, to the north with Poland, to the east with the Ukraine, and to the south with Austria and Hungary, The country is divided into three regions. Bohemia, to the west, is the principal tourist area, and also contains the Czech and Federal capital, Prague. Moravia, in the middle, is the principal agricultural area. Bohemia and Moravia together comprise the Czech Republic ("the Czechlands"). To the east is Slovakia, a largely mountainous area, but containing the fertile Danube plain.

The Czechoslovak climate is typically cental European - mild summers and cold (to British standards, harsh) winters. Rain is frequent throughout the year, but is most common in the early winter months.

The Czechoslovak economy is highly industrialised and was, until recently, entirely under State ownership. Since it began in the February of 1991, privatisation has been moving slowly but steadily forward. Even though disposing of the larger enterprises has been slowed by a bureaucratic, if probably workable, voucher scheme, 20,500 small enterprises had been sold by the end of 1991. At the same time, according to estimates by the central bank, about 10% of the economy was in private hands. The current intention is to continue privatising until only defence, money and a few basic infrastructures remain in government ownership.

Since the January of 1991, virtually all prices have been liberalised. Subsidies and controls remain for a few basic goods. But the legal maximum is in many cases above the market price.

During 1991, about 4,400 joint ventures were registered with the Federal Ministry of Finance. Total foreign investment for the year exceeded $1 billion.

The agricultural sector is extremely important to Czechoslovakia, two of its major exports being beer and timber. However, the country is poor in many natural resources, mainly fossil fuels, and still relies, if to a decreasing extent, on the countries of the former Soviet Union to supply these.

The effect of 40 years of State planning was to leave the country with a prevalence of obsolete heavy industry, much of it unable to compete at any likely price on the world market. The Czechoslovak economic plight, however, is not so serious as in Poland or the former German Democratic Republic, there being many much good light industry - including textiles, ceramics and glassware - that can be modernised with relative ease.

The country also has a low external debt ratio - $9.3 billion at the end of 1991, as opposed to $19.9 billion for Hungary and $33.5 billion for Poland.

Attempts are being made to revive Czechoslovakia's traditional trading links with the west. These have been successful to date. During the first nine months of 1991, 40% of its exports went to the EEC - an increase of 17% on the same period the previous year. Most of this trade was with Germany and Austria, though British and French economic involvement with the country is growing fast.

The economy is currently in deep recession. Part of this is due to the collapse of the Soviet market, part to the sharp tightening of monetary control in 1991. During that year, GDP fell by 14.3%, having fallen by 3.5% the previous year. During 1992, a further decline is expected, of around 3%, before recovery begins in 1993.

From virtually nothing at the end of 1990, unemployment rose to 6.6% of the total labour force. This compares well with the Hungarian rise to around 13% and the Polish rise to around 12%. Its distribution, however, has contributed to arguments between the republics, since the rate for Slovakia reached 11.8%, against 4.4% in the Czechlands. This imbalance is explained by the greater concentration of heavy industry in the east of the country, together with the collapse of its traditional markets, in the Soviet Union and the domestic weapons industry.

Until 1918, the whole modern territory of Czechoslovakia was part of the Habsburg Empire, the Czechlands being part of Austria and Slovakia part of Hungary. Heir to a highly developed civic culture, the First Republic did rather well, by 1933 being the only multi-party democracy left in Central Europe. In 1938, however, those areas of the Czechlands populated by the German minority were awarded to Hitler in a revision of borders consented to by Britain and France (the Munich Settlement). On March 14th 1939, the remaining Czechlands were annexed by Hitler, and Slovakia was granted nominal independence under the Roman Catholic priest Jozef Tiso.

Following its reestablishment in 1945, with somewhat altered borders, Czechoslovakia fell increasingly under Soviet influence. Though defeated in Slovakia by the Peasants' Party, the Communists won a majority large enough in the Czechlands in the 1946 general elections to secure all the key ministries in the federal coalition. After two years of subversion and intrigue, they at last took complete power in a ministerial coup, and set about turning the country into a grim, Stalinist tyranny.

From about 1960, a new generation of Communist leaders - most notably Alexander Dubcek - began to experiment with various schemes of economic and political liberalisation. These culminated in the "Prague Spring" of 1968, and were immediately suppressed by the Warsaw Pact invasion of that year.

For the next 20 years, the country remained one of the most repressive police states in Europe. Then, in the November of 1989, following collapses elsewhere in the Soviet Bloc, the Communist Government resigned. By the end of the year, Vaclav Havel, an internationally renowned playwright and former political prisoner, was sworn in as President. His predecessor, Gustav Husak, retired to private life, dying in the November of 1991. Having lived an ardent Brezhnevite, Husak returned on his deathbed to the Roman Catholic Church, being absolved of his sins by the Archbishop of Sokol - a reconciliation variously regarded as edifying or scandalous.

The Czechs and Slovaks are separate peoples. Though mutually comprehensible, their languages are different. There are many other differences, of history, culture and legal organisation. These differences have become progressively more important in the practical sense since 1989. During the demonstrations against the Communist regime, and in the subsequent negotiations with it, the Czechs were represented by Civic Forum and the Slovaks by Public against Violence. These two groups have a good record of cooperation, but have never been able to merge into a single party.

Civic Forum is the party of President Havel. It is not, however, a united party in the western sense, containing a great variety of views on any particular position. Its current Chairman is the Federal Finance Minister, Vaclav Klaus, an advocate of very rapid transformation to a market economy. His election effectively split Civic Forum into two factions, both represented in the Czech Parliament. There is the Club of the Democratic Right, led by Klaus, and the Liberal Club, led by the Federal Minister for International Relations, Jiri Dienstbier. Havel is formally aloof from this division, but tends to favour the leftists within the party.

It is expected that in the general election set for June 1992, Klaus will win a majority in the Czech Parliament, either outright, or in coalition with smaller rightist parties, so confirming the restoration of capitalism and democracy in the Czechlands.

Slovak politics is rather less stable. Repeated and increasingly less reconcilable disputes between the Federal and the Slovak Governments over competencies led in the middle of 1991 to a split in Public Against Violence. The more nationalist wing, led by the Party leader and Slovak Prime Minister, Vladimir Meciar, left to form the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia. Emphasising the disparity of the unemployment level and other key indicators between the two republics, it advocates greater autonomy for Slovakia and a slowing of economic reform. Renamed Civic Democratic Forum, and led by Martin Porubjak, the remainder of Public Against Violence continues to work closely with the Klaus faction in the Federal Parliament. Its popularity, however, has collapsed, from about a quarter of the vote in the June of 1990 to far less than the 5% of the vote needed to secure deputies in the next Parliament (see below).

This division was further embittered by the dismissal of Meciar from Office in the April of 1991 for alleged misuse of power. He was accused of having collaborated with the Czechoslovak secret police before the revolution, and of having maintained his links with them since. If only half of the allegations made against him were true, he would be guilty of the most immense political and personal corruption, and would be one of the most dangerous politicians in Central Europe since Adolf Hitler. He remains the most popular man in Slovakia (see below).

Meciar was replaced as Prime Minister by Jan Carnogursky, leader of the Christian Democratic Movement and a former human rights lawyer. His government, though committed to gaining greater Slovak autonomy, has worked closely with the Federal Government in implementing the economic reform program. At best grudgingly respected, he is not popular, and is not expected to survive in office after the June 1992 elections, giving way to Meciar.

The approximate balance of political forces in Slovakia as of May 1992 is as follows:

Even assuming this ranking in the opinion polls reflects the balance of power in the next Slovak Parliament, no one knows what will happen after June. Some say that Meciar will declare an independent Slovak state, relying on SNP and Communist support; and that he will then restore the old regime so far as he can. Others are less pessimistic, pointing to the fact that Meciar has never proposed to do either of these things - whatever he allows many of his supporters to believe or hope - and that he may not find it in his interest to do either. They also stress how unstable is Meciar's party, and how unlikely it is to hold together once it is in government and is compelled to make clear decisions on those matters about which it has been careful in opposition to say nothing definite. Also, the recent election of Alexander Dubcek to the leadership of the previously minuscule Social Democratic Party may take votes away from Meciar. Though old and in poor health, Dubcek remains a hero in Slovakia; and he may become important after June as an elder statesman, able to shake or stabilise coalitions.

The Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia claimed 700,000 members in November 1991. Its age structure: 6% under 30; 58%, 31-60; 36% over 60. Occupational structure: 31% manual labourers; 25% intelligentsia; others unknown. Renamed the Party of the Democratic Left, the Communists in Slovakia claimed 192,000 members, with an estimated 25% of them inactive.

The Presidium of the old Czechoslovak Communist Party, together with the Central Committee, was abolished at the 18th Party Congress in November 1990. Both were replaced with a Federal Council of twelve members from each of the two parties.

Most of the old auxiliary organisations have been dissolved or reorganised since the revolution. Its only publication to survive is Rude Pravo, its daily newspaper in the Czechlands. Though Pravda continues to publish in Slovakia, it now calls itself an independent newspaper of the left, and no longer automatically supports the Communist line on any issue.

In the Czechlands, the Communists are irreconcilably split between various factions of Stalinists, Trotskyites, and social democrats. In Slovakia, led by Peter Weis, a young and politically astute newcomer, the PDL has become more Keynesian in its public statements than Marxist-Leninist.

In the June 1990 elections, the 300 seats in the Federal Parliament were awarded as follows:

There are a number of fringe parties - anarchists, neo-nazis, etc. But these are of no importance numerically, and are no threat to the newly established political order.

Until the revolution, the trade unions in Czechoslovakia were an arm of the State, their function being to carry out Party policy in the workplace. This system was directed by the Council of Trade Unions (Ustredni Rada Odboru, or URO), which was the governing body of the Revolutionary Trade Union Movement (Revolucni Odborove Hnuti, or ROH). The ROH was organised into 18 federations.

After the revolution, these unions lost the bulk of their members. Their popularity did revive somewhat as they began to oppose privatisation. But they have not survived the transition to a free market economy. They were not helped by the revelation that many of their leaders were exposed as active members of the secret police. The ROH dissolved itself in March 1991, and the old unions since then have been a marginal force.

To date, the union movement as a whole remains weak. New unions have not filled the place vacated by the old ones. This is partly due to the lack of leadership skills among the organisers, and partly to a widespread fear of unemployment, which has tended to prevent most kinds of union activism.

A valid passport is required for entry to Czechoslovakia. A British Visitor's Passport is not yet acceptable. All visa requirements have been abolished, as have restrictions on temporary residence. In practice, visitors from America and Western Europe may stay as long as they please without official interference.

The national airline, Czechoslovak Airlines, has recently been bought by Air France. The flight time from London to Prague (PRG) (Ruzyne) is 1 hour and 45 minutes. The airport is about 10 miles from the city centre, which is reached by coach, bus or taxi. Depending on traffic conditions, the journey time is between 30 and 40 minutes. The other international airport is at Bratislava (BTS) (Ivanka), and is served as yet from continental Europe only. This airport is about 7.5 miles from the city centre, and is reached by bus or taxi. The journey time here is about 30 minutes, again depending on traffic conditions.

Most major cities - Prague, Ostrava, Bratislava, Poprad, Karlovy Vary, Piestany, Sliac, Kosice and Brno - are linked by an extensive domestic air network operated by Czechoslovak Airlines. Fares are by western standards very low.

Otherwise, there is a reasonably efficient railway network operated by Czechoslovak State Railways which links most major towns. Railway tickets are cheap by western standards, but the trains are slow and often dirty.

The trunk roads and motorways are quite good. Car hire is available now in most large towns. Seatbelts are compulsory, even if few local drivers bother to observe this requirement. Drinking and driving is completely prohibited, and is punishable by imprisonment. Though they seem lax in enforcing most others, the Police are very strict in enforcing this law. Petrol stations are often closed in the evening.

Urban public transport is cheap and efficient. There are busses, trams, trolley busses, and in Prague an extensive metro system. Tickets for all these services should be bought in advance either from tobacco kiosks or from special coin-operated machines. There is a flat fare for each journey. In Prague, this is Kcs4, and in other towns Kcs3. Anyone planning to stay in one town more than a month can buy a travel pass for Kcs100. This buys unlimited travel on the town network. Spot checks for fare evasion are infrequent, and the fine is Kcs100.

Though it is wise to observe all the usual precautions against overcharging, the taxis are on the whole cheap and efficient.

There are two official languages in Czechoslovakia - Czech, spoken in Bohemia and Moravia, and Slovak, spoken in Slovakia. Russian - before 1989, compulsory in all secondary schools - German and English are also spoken. German is the most widely spoken foreign language, though English is fast overtaking. As yet, only 7% of the whole population regards itself as fluent in English, and a good working knowledge cannot be assumed in even the best educated or senior people. It is therefore advisable for any foreign resident either to learn the local language or to employ an interpreter.

It is important not to confuse Czechs and Slovaks. A Slovak will consider it an insult to be called a Czech - and sometimes even to be called a Czechoslovak. It is also important to ensure that the local language is used. Do not, for example, hire a Czech interpreter for a conversation with Slovaks.

It is normal for men to wear suits for business. otherwise, dress should be casual but conservative, except at formal dinners or in expensive dinners or restaurants. Forms of greeting are the same as in Western Europe. It is important, though, to be aware of the local fondness for alcohol. This is offered in disturbingly large quantities to all guests except children and invalids; and offence is often taken if it is not all drunk. A careful line should be drawn between accepting the drink offered and limiting consumption.

There are three police forces now in Czechoslovakia. The first and potentially most dangerous is the remnants of the old secret police (StB). Though formally disbanded, this is still active in many places - especially in the bureaucracy. Partly the network is financed through continued payments from the interest on foreign bank accounts opened years ago and not closed after the revolution. Partly, the agents have gone freelance and are offering their skills to the highest bidder, these tending to be the leaders of extremist political parties. Though the mails are now reasonably secure, the telephones are still tapped.

There are two kinds of legal police force. The first are the forces run by the Czech and Slovak governments. The officers wear bottle green uniforms, are poorly paid and often shabby. They carry handguns, but appear to be concerned mainly with traffic control. The Slovak police are thought to be in sympathy with the more nationalist political movements, but are on the whole too apathetic to act on their prejudices.

Then there are the private police employed directly by the municipal authorities. These are armed and have virtually full police powers. The Prague contract is operated by a branch of Pinkerton's. The police here wear blue uniforms. The Bratislava contract is operated by a German firm. Known as "Black Sheriffs", the police here are dressed from head to toe in macho black leather.

Gun ownership is surprisingly common. All men must perform military duty and are trained in the use of arms. There are no restrictions on the holding of hunting guns in the country. In the towns, handgun permits are issued almost on demand by the police. There is also a flourishing black market in weapons and equipment stolen from the Russian army of occupation which pulled out in the June of 1991. A genuine AK47 with all accessories, for example, can be bought for as little at $75.

At present, there are no organised terrorist groups in Czechoslovakia. While there has been some terrorist activity, this has not been traced to specific groups. The principal suspects, however, are former Communists, attempting either to show their resentment at having been removed from power or possibly to try to destabilise the new democracy. It is also likely that the now disbanded elite "anti-terrorist" military unit, the Red Berets - who spent far more of their time training than hunting terrorists - are involved in these terror attacks.

According to confidential sources in the Slovak Government, there has been a series of unreported attempted bombings - all discovered and defused - against the offices of the Civic Democratic Forum. Again, since there have been no claims of responsibility, it is impossible to ascribe direct blame. The culprits may be former Communists or nationalist extremists, or nihilistic youths.

No terrorist threat has yet become sufficiently pressing for there to be any tightening of security. In Bratislava, for example, it is possible to meet any Minister or high official with any security check whatever. There is some security outside the Slovak Parliament. But this is amateurish, compared with any western effort, and is noticeable mainly on account of its uniqueness.

Nor is there any terrorist threat to foreigners. No example is known of any western tourist, businessman or adviser attacked for political reasons.

It is possible that the differences between the various ethnic and cultural groups in Czechoslovakia may become more serious. The Czechs and Slovaks do not on the whole like each other. Neither groups like the Gypsies, of whom there are 4-800,000: an October 1991 poll in the Czechlands, for example, found that 91% of those questioned took an unfavourable view of Gypsies. The Slovaks tend not to like or to be liked by the 500,000 Hungarians living in Slovakia. The few western journalists who travel out from Prague to Slovakia usually find a market for stories of rising antisemitic prejudice.

But the possibility of serious trouble is remote. People who were surprised by the current civil wars in Yugoslavia had ignored the long history of mutual hatred and violence between the various communities. There is no such history in Czechoslovakia. Apart from the 50 years to 1989, both halves of the country have a continuous civic culture reaching back to the middle ages. Whatever differences they have, all the democratic parties are committed to reintegrating Czechoslovakia into the mainstream of western civilisation.

Much is said about the visit of President Havel to Bratislava on the 28th October 1991 to celebrate the anniversary of the Federal state. He was shouted at by nationalists, and had an egg thrown at him. Except that his entourage panicked and hurried him back to Prague, and there was nothing else to talk about at the time, this was a trivial incident; and no large theories of bubbling hatreds between the Czechs and Slovaks can be founded on it.

Certainly, the worsening economic situation in Slovakia is strengthening nationalist sentiment. But this sentiment has been most generally manifested so far in a series of interminable wrangling between "federalists" and "confederalists" - this latter group trying to reach a formula which will combine the economic and military benefits of a continued federation with the national self-esteem of complete independence.

According to one foreign observer who has learned the language and travelled extensively through the country, the Slovaks are not passionate nationalists. Instead, they enjoy the thrill of talking about independence, but are far more concerned about the price and availability of tinned mushrooms. So long as nothing much changes before the economic revival, expected in 1993, the common state will not be dissolved from Bratislava.

If it does dissolve, however, there is then a chance of instability. The Hungarian minority is largely reconciled to living within Czechoslovakia. Its language and culture are both respected by the Federal Government. It has better safeguards of fair treatment than any other national minority in the former Soviet Bloc. It is far less happy at the prospect of living within an independent Slovak state. In the January of 1992, the Hungarian Parliament passed an act giving citizenship to all Hungarians living abroad. This was directed mainly at the Romanian Government, which still persecutes its national minorities. But it also gives an excuse for the Hungarians to intervene in any future dispute between Slovaks and Hungarians in Slovakia.

As for the talk of antisemitism, this can be discounted - if only for the rather grim reason that there are hardly any Jews left in the country. The flourishing community of nearly 100,000 before 1939 has shrunk, by murder and emigration, to about 3,500. Even if the Slovak people did go collectively wild with antisemitism, there would be no opportunity for the pogrom so readily predicted in some parts of the western press.

But, in truth, there is no increase of anti-Jewish sentiment. The part played by Slovaks 50 years ago in the holocaust is shocking, but is no different from the part played by any other people in Eastern and Central Europe; and the part played by the Poles, the Czechs, the Hungarians, and the Germans and Austrians is not on the whole a current issue in the western press. Most Slovaks today regard that aspect of the past with horror; and the current Prime Minister has gone repeatedly on record to condemn the 1942 deportations and to foster closer ties with the State of Israel.

There is antisemitic graffiti on many public buildings, and some Jewish cemeteries have been vandalised. But this happens, if must be recalled, even in England. The mood of a people cannot be deduced from what is scribbled on walls: it only takes one fanatic with a can of spray paint to mount a verbal pogrom.

The main current security problem in Czechoslovakia, in common with many other former Communist states, is the rapidly rising crime rate - though this is still far lower than the western average. The increase has various causes - most notably poor economic conditions and the removal of the police state structures, so making working conditions much easier for criminals.

A future security problem is the possible flood of Ukrainian refugees entering the country to escape from harsh economic conditions, and from the nationalist conflicts emerging there as the union breaks up and ancient enmities emerge on the Yugoslav model.

Since there is no terrorist threat to westerners, the best security advice must concentrate on nothing worse than the avoidance of criminal attacks.

Though local standards are rising fast - particularly among the young - westerners are usually immediately recognisable from their dress. There is no hostility to them, however. Indeed, strangers are generally treated with marked courtesy. The only reason for using taxis as opposed to public transport is that the latter is often confusing. Even so, the usual advice must be given - that large amounts of cash should snot be carried about, and that valuables should be left in safe deposit boxes at one's hotel. Pickpockets are an increasing menace in the main tourist attractions; and a photocopy of one's passport should be made in case of theft.

The British Embassy does not advise that passports should be carried at all times. Though some form of identification must be carried by law, this does not need to be an original passport.

Both Prague and Bratislava can be regarded as safe cities. They are both reasonably prosperous. Neither as yet has any established problem with street crime. Westerners are advised, however, not to stray into the suburbs late in the evening. This is mainly because the pubic transport is less efficient as the night wears on, and taxis tend to cruise only in the town centres. Also, there are some unsafe areas in every town. In Bratislava, for example, Trnavka is to be avoided, on account of the emerging underclass that lives there. Also, Petrzalka, which is the biggest housing estate in Europe, situated on the right bank of the Danube, is a notorious labyrinth, and can be expected to become progressively less safe as a generation unused to the restraints of a police state grows to adolescence.

But, for the moment, any visitor from London or new York will be surprised at how orderly and secure Czechoslovak towns are.

Accommodation is generally good, Czechoslovakia having a highly developed tourist industry. During the peak season - July and August, but also the Prague Spring Festival in mid-May to early June - there is frequently a shortage of accommodation and advance booking is recommended.

Czechoslovak hotels are cheap by western standards, though service and other facilities are often rather limited by western standards. The hotels have only recently adopted the star rating system, and many continue to display the old system which is explained as follows:

a)Hotel Forum
Kongresova Ul.
Tel (01042 2) 410 000

b)Inter-Continental Hotel
43-5 Namesti Curievych
Praha 1
Tel (0104 2) 65341

a)Hotel Forum
Mierove Namestie 2
Tel (01042 7) 348 111